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PROTECTION OF PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS: THE PRINCIPLE OF
RATIONAL CONNECTION BETWEEN PARTIES AND LAWS*
by
Amos Shapira :*
I. THE "JUSTICE IN THE PARTICULAR CASE" DILEMMA

The overwhelming "policy" overtones of current American conflicts

theories tend to overshadow the basic fact that in every choice-of-law
case one encounters at least two individual parties whose conflicting claims
need to be justly adjudicated. More specifically, an approach strictly
focusing on governmental socio-economic interests is prone to overlook or underplay a fundamental problem present in many choice-oflaw situations: the reasonableness or fairness of a proposed appraisal of
human conduct by foreign legal norms. This dilemma, typical of conflicts contexts, emanates from a general jurisprudential reluctance to
engage in what may sometimes be regarded as an unfair process of
judging conduct according to the legal standards of a foreign community.
The degree of unfairness might depend directly on the size of the gap
between the cultural philosophies, social structures, and moral precepts
of the implicated jurisdictions. In a federal union like the United States,
constitutional guarantees-such as those embodied in the due process,
equal protection, and privileges and immunities clauses of the Constitution'-are designed to protect the individual parties from gross unfairness in the application of a foreign standard. The same function must
be fulfilled in the transnational arena by the very method adopted for
choice of law in conflicts adjudication.
The idea of "justice in the particular case" has served as a clich6 for
many conflicts writers, the bulk of whom, however, have failed to transform this desideratum into a workable choice-of-law methodology. Thus,
e.g., "justice" has been pointed to as an underlying principle of English
private international law. Cheshire, an outstanding contemporary English
authority on the subject, predicates English conflicts law theory on the
principle of "justice."' Another leading authority, Graveson, follows
suit and offers the proposition that "rational justice" is "the principal
basis of the English conflict of laws."8 The very same concept of justice
has been repeatedly invoked by English judges in support of their decisions in conflicts cases, particularly in areas not dominated by compelling
precedent.!
* This Article is based on a section of a book by the author, entitled The Interest Approach
to Choice of Law, recently published by Martinus Nijhoff, N.V., in the Hague, Netherlands.
**M. Jur., The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; M.C.L., Columbia University; J.S.D., Yale
University. Member of the Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University, Israel.
' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and art. IV, § 2.
'See Graveson, Philosophical Aspects of the English Conflict of Laws, 78 L.Q. REV. 337, 348
(1962). See generally G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1965).
a Graveson, supra note 2, at 3 5.
4
id. at 354.
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On the American scene, Cavers' famous 1933 articles is habitually
cited-whether in tones of praise or, more often, of denunciation-as a
classic expression of the "justice in the particular case" aspiration in the
choice-of-law process. In that article Cavers reiterates his conviction that
a court of law, when adjudicating a domestic as well as a conflicts controversy, is obliged to consider all the pertinent aspects of the case before
reaching a final decision, even where the dispute lacks any important
social significance! Such judicial responsibility is not exhausted unless
and until the forum evaluates the probable impact of any proposed
resolution in terms of justice to the private litigants before it. It goes
without saying that judicial justice can only be administered with a view
to particular issues and individual parties."
Many hostile critics interpreted Cavers' 1933 utterances as flatly advocating "Khadi justice," 8 leaving no room for choice-of-law rules of any
sort. Ehrenzweig's is a characteristic attribution to Cavers of a "counsel
of despair" to the effect "that traditional choice of law rules be completely discarded and that the choice be made in each case with a view
toward doing justice between the parties."' Such a regime of uncontrolled,
unguided sense of justice, he warns, can only lead to confusion and
anarchy.'0 It must be conceded that Cavers' sweeping and rather vague
formulations could in fact reasonably be understood to import such a
conception of particularized justice." Cavers himself realized it, and in
his recent monograph he is eager unequivocally to disavow any such
"impractical pursuit of the elusive will-o'-the-wisp of justice in the
particular case."'" Instead, he advances the criterion of "fairness to the
parties" to rank equally with the "policy" factor in the choice-of-law
process. 3 The author urges decision-makers in the conflicts sphere to
seek solutions which not only provide a reasonable accommodation for
governmental policies, but which also secure fair treatment to the private
parties, lest they be unjustly exposed to surprise and entrapment. 4
In the writings of various conflicts scholars one is apt to come across
basically similar references, albeit with varying degrees of explicitness
and elaboration, to this dichotomy between governmental policies and
fairness to the individual litigants. Thus, Lorenzen in 1924," Harper in
'Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, in SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS 110 (compiled by the Association of American Law Schools 1956).

'Id. at 111.
TSee Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Reading Professor Lorenzen's
Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1174 (1947).
I.e., an unstructured, open-ended exercise of judicial
discretion.
9A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 346 (1962) (emphasis in original).
'"Id. at 347.
" In a laterpublication Cavers again invokes the consideration whether in a particular case
"resortto the other state's
law [would be] more justto the parties
. . . than [would be] resort

to the forum's own law." Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process
-Some
Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1126, 1139 (1960).
I'D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 14 (1965).
1aid. at 31, 32, 66, 67, 89, 122, 162 n.31.
4 Id. at 80, 121. Cavers admonishes judicial tribunals sitting in choice-of-law cases "to assess
the respective policies and equities bearing on the issue before the court." Cavers, Comment on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1219, 1220 n.5 (1963).
"See Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 748
(1924).
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1947," and Nadelmann in 1963 17 are respectively inclined to analyze choiceof-law issues in terms of both governmental interests and individual
justice. Still others, notably Rheinstein, ardently cling to an extreme
"justice to the parties" conception of conflict of laws: "the primary
policy, indeed the very raison d'etre of conflicts law, is the policy of
mitigating for individuals the inconveniences and problems that can
arise through the actual or potential conflict of differing states' norms of
judicial decision."'" This being so, it naturally follows that any choice-oflaw system which builds on the concept of governmental policies must
be deprecated if it fails to secure equitable adjustment of the interests
of private litigants entrapped in a conflict-of-laws turmoil." Such a system is deplorable for attempting to promote states' interests at the expense of private parties unfairly caught in surprise due to the invocation
of an uncontemplated law."
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one finds Currie thundering
that "vested rights and reasonable expectations may be disturbed when
the public interest demands that result."'" Completely overtaken by
strictly pragmatic "policy" thinking, he declines to account for the
"fairness to the private parties" aspect of the choice-of-law process in
any meaningful manner. Currie evidently adheres to the dichotomy between state policies and the interests of the individual parties involved in
litigation, and places a predominant, if not indeed exclusive, emphasis on
the former." His professed conviction is that the choice-of-law process
should serve as a tool for a consistent effectuation of governmental policies, which he usually frames in narrowly-conceived socio-economic
terms. But even in Currie's writings one comes across scattered, frequently
obscure, utterances urging courts to reach results which are not only
rational, but also just. Judges ought not to subject the rights of a party
to exploitation, nor sacrifice them in exchange for some governmental
policy gains." At one point he is prepared to concede a secondary, residuary role to the "justice between the parties" consideration: it may be
invoked as a decisive judicial criterion in situations which do not present
any ascertainable conflict of states' interests.'" At another point, he
" See Harper, supra note 7, at 1161, 1174.
17"[T]he governmental interest analysis can . . . be used . . . when, in the case before the
court, the parties' expectations and other otherwise pertinent considerations must be overridden
on public policy grounds strong enough to justify such non-consideration." Nadelmann, Marginal
Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PaoB. 860, 861
(1963).
8
' Rheinstein, Book Review, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 375 (1965). This approach runs parallel
to what seems to be a rather popular contemporary European view of the function of conflicts
law. Kegel, e.g., intimates that "in conflicts law . . . the interests at stake are private and the
aim is justice between individuals." Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES COURS
95, 207 (1964-1I).
19Rheinstein, supra note 18, at 376.
0
. See Rheinstein, Book Review, 11 AM. J. COmp. L. 632, 658 (1962).
' B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 621 (1963).
" One of Currie's followers, Baxter, expressly subscribes to such a view: "[Choice-of-law]
cases can be decided by viewing them as instances of conflicting state interests rather than of conflicting private interests." Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1,
22 (1963).
2See B. CURRIE, supra note 21, at 596-97.
24Id. at 65.
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actually allows the surprising admission that "[i]n the field of international private law, fairness to the litigants ought to be the primary consideration.""
Such concessions to the "justice" desideratum, somewhat grudgingly
made by Currie, serve to support the proposition rejecting in the first
place a rigid policy-fairness dichotomy. Such a dichotomy, accepted by
him as well as by many of his critics, presupposes a calculus of public
interests which is jurisprudentially distinct from the assessment of private
interests. Conversely, the thesis advanced herein conceives of the process
of public and private interests analysis as a unitary, coherent entity. Considerations relating to the fairness of judging a party's conduct by foreign
legal prescriptions do form an integral part of the forum's own public
interests and are inseparable from the general process of interest analysis.
II.

THE PRINCIPLE OF RATIONAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
PARTIES AND LAWS

A widely recognized jurisprudential principle calls for rational connection between the parties to a dispute and the legal standards by which
their conduct is to be judged as a threshold guarantee of elementary justice in the judicial process.' This, in fact, is a major idea encompassed by
the familiar American constitutional concept of due process of law."
The criterion for the ascertainment of such a proper connection is ultimately derivable from the sense of reasonableness and fairness possessed
by the tribunal adjudicating the cause. It follows that so far as the assessment of the private interests of the parties in the fair application of a
duly connected law is concerned, the only relevant notions of appropriateness are those prevalent at the forum. Hence, the calculus of the private
interests at stake should not ordinarily entail an encounter with foreign
legal conceptions.
Under the traditional conflicts approach, with its territorialist quest
and rigid choice-of-law rules, almost no consideration is devoted to an
analysis of rational connection between litigants and "governing" laws.
A similar attitude, though stemming from an altogether different methodological foundation, is taken by Currie. The whole issue of rational
connection is dealt with in a single brief footnote, where he poses the
question "whether the power of an interested state to apply its law is qualified if the party adversely affected has not in some fashion 'subjected'
himself to that law," only to maintain that "it is not so limited . . .. "
Contrariwise, such criteria as "fair reliance," "reasonable expectations,"
25Id. at 122.
26 The judicial process requires "some reasonable connection between the individual and the
prescription asserted and some notice that he is subject to the prescription." Katzenbach, Conflicts
on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65
YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 n.30 (1956).
27 See id. at 1132-33; cf. Briggs, The Need for the "Legislative Jurisdictional Principle" in a
Policy
28 Centered Conflict of Laws, 39 MINN. L. REv. 517, 532 (1955).
B. CURRIE, supra note 21, at 266 n.294.
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"foreseeability," and "calculability" are deemed paramount in Ehrenz-

weig' " and Rheinstein's' conflicts philosophies.
Various concepts have been used to try to convey the rational connection idea, with varying degrees of success. Some of these concepts are
partially overlapping. The following are the most familiar.
A. The "Submission and Consent" Fallacy
The concepts of "submission" and "consent" are quite popular in the
realm of traditional conflicts doctrine, particularly with regard to questions of jurisdiction. In the choice-of-law sphere it is sometimes asserted
that one should not regard as unreasonable or unfair a determination of
the juridical consequences of a party's activity by the more exacting legal
standards effective at the place of conduct, even though the law of that
party's home state is more lenient with respect to such operations. This
is allegedly so because the party in question had the option not to engage
in activities at the place of more stringent legal standards. Once he elects
to pursue such activities there, he has thereby declared his "consent" or
"submission" to be governed by whatever prohibitions and regulations
are in force at the place of conduct. The actor "subjects" himself to or
"assumes the risk," so to speak, of a possible enhanced liability by virtue
of the very fact of acting in a foreign environment. Moreover, he can
normally take some measures to alleviate the risk, e.g., by acquiring
liability-insurance coverage."
It is submitted that a conceptualization of the rational connection
principle in terms of submission and consent is often mechanical and at
times nothing but fictional. After all, wrongdoers, for instance, do not
ordinarily go around consciously and willingly "submitting," prior to
committing a wrong, to the legal standards prescribed by the place of
conduct. Any meaningful invocation of the concepts of consent, submission, or assumption of risk presupposes some noticeable measure of
conscious awareness and subjective act of will on the part of the allegedly
"submitting" party. Such psychological conditions are notoriously wanting in many conflicts situations. However, in some distinct instances it
does make sense to reason in terms of submission and consent. This is the
case, e.g., where a commercial enterprise explicitly undertakes to be regulated by the corporation laws of a foreign jurisdiction as a formal prerequisite to the granting of permission to do business there.

B. The "Foreseeability" or "Vindication of Justified
Expectations" Desideratum
The protection of the "justified expectations" of the private parties
to a legal relationship is a much-acclaimed goal habitually reiterated
29See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 9, at 451, 453.

" See, e.g., Rheinstein, Ehrenzweig on the Law of Conflict of Laws, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 238,
241

(1965).
31 See Wengler, The Significance of the Principle of Equality in the Conflict of Laws, 28
& CONThMP. PROB. 822, 840-41 (1963).
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throughout traditional legal writings, with special emphasis in the conflicts sphere. It is commonly said to lie "at the bottom of most of our
private law and a good deal of our public law too.""' It supposedly constitutes "the raison d'etre for the existence of our entire law of contract."'
It is often praised as a highly ranking principle of justice which "permeates
the whole body of rules of conflict of laws."' 4 It is frequently endorsed as
a paramount expression of the assumption upon which the entire administration of law is predicated: that people will investigate the law as
it affects their activities and plan their conduct accordingly." Hence,
it would seem manifestly inapt and unjust to subject a litigant to legal
standards which could not reasonably be expected to have been considered by him prior to undertaking the course of conduct in question.
Elementary justice is inextricably interwoven with considerations of foreseeability and predictability.'
The customary juristic enthusiasm about the "vindication of reasonable
expectations" desideratum, which on the face of it is nothing but admirable, often proves unwarranted when scrutinized in pragmatic terms.
Many of those committed to the parties' foreseeability goal tend to ignore
the crucial fact that in order to merit legal protection such expectations
ought not only to be justified, but in the first instance they should be
actual, existing in fact, and capable of realistic identification. 7 The compulsive inclination to infer or impute private expectations to individuals
implicated in a legal controversy, even where the expectations in point of
fact do not exist or are not appropriately evidenced, could obscure legal
reasoning. Such a juristic indulgence in the assessment of subjective expectability as to the governance of legal rules may readily provide an ideal
ground for frequently fictitious speculations. Time and again judges
and writers undertake an extremely speculative analysis of the presumed

expectations of parties engaged in some sort of a legal interaction. The assumed hypothesis seems to be that, as a rule, individuals can and do in
fact form conscious expectations as to the identity of the normative

criteria by which their involvements may be tested. Far from being
axiomatic, the tenability of such a hypothesis is highly dubious.
Further, the vast bulk of the "promotion of justified expectations"
proponents have usually given little or no attention to the implications

of a possible interplay of conflicting "reasonable expectations" of the
two or more parties to a dispute. Also, such proponents have generally
assumed as a matter of course that the time during which expectations are
relevant culminates and terminates with the consummation of the occur32 Rheinstein, supra note 30, at 241.

334 Id.

" Neuner, Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws, 20 CAN. B. REv. 479, 482 (1942).

a Hancock, Choice-of-Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 133, 142
(1943).

'See 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 304 (2d ed. 1960).
' Cf. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 297
(1966).
8 "Foreseeability has been misused and misapplied in many areas of the law .
Toward the Proper Law of the Tort, 40 TEXAS L. REv. 336, 347 (1962).

Childers,
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rence at hand. All other arguably-pertinent expectations created at some
later stage are automatically brushed aside without deliberation. Thus, for
instance, parties' reasonable foresights and calculations once a dispute has
arisen with regard to the desirability of commencing a lawsuit in one
court or another, submitting to arbitration, seeking some administrative
relief, or negotiating a private settlement are invariably rejected out-ofhand as irrelevant.
It is willingly conceded that the vindication of genuine and reasonable
private expectations is, in and of itself, a valid public interest in any
free society. No one can seriously dispute the desirability of a general
community goal calling for the fulfillment, rather than the frustration,
of individuals' actual and legitimate expectations wherever possible, in
conjunction with other pressing public interests." Furthermore, one may
even refer to the entire legal process in terms of a constant flow of community expectations derived from past trends, expounded in present
claims, and tuned to pertinent social values. Though not necessarily ideal,
such a conception is not implausible, provided the term "community
expectations" is understood to encompass the community's moral precepts and social conventions. What is firmly objected to is the notorious
readiness, characteristic of many traditionalists, to reason in terms of specific expectations of individual adversaries as to the applicable law, irrespective of whether the concrete factual context admits of such reasoning. The incongruous nature of such a process of reasoning is manifest in
a host of purely domestic situations and, a fortiori, in transnational controversies where the parties "often live under different legal systems and
therefore have no common legal or extra-legal customs and expectations."'
Consensual Arrangements. It is fairly obvious that considerations pertaining to the foreseeability, predictability, and fair expectations of a party
to a dispute may vary immensely in their intrinsic validity, from the
trivial to the crucial, from one particular type of legal interaction to
another. Thus, in the sphere of consensual arrangements, and most notably
commercial transactions, the factors of private ordering and individual
planning, which depend heavily on predictability, are indeed of substantial significance. In the great bulk of consensual involvements, negotiated

transactions in particular, one can fairly assume that the participants
ordinarily interact within a consciously acknowledged atmosphere of
law and with a general awareness of the relevance of legal prescriptions.
If the participants negotiate in good faith against such a background, one
can further assume that they normally contemplate the forming of a
'""[A] basic interest in our social and economic and political system . . . is that wherever
possible, without undue sacrifice of other equally basic interests, our legal system should endeavour
to make certain that the normal, reasonable, legitimate expectations of persons are achieved instead
of frustrated." Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RUTGERs L. REV.
523, 561 (1959). Kramer goes further to propose a general presumption in favor of this key interest in the interpretation of statutory language. Id.
40Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 795, 803 (1963).
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binding relationship. But such a commonly-postulated state of mind of
parties to consensual arrangements does not exclude an equally sound
assumption as to their reliance on legal protection which extends not
only to the transaction as such, but also to the individual interests of
each of them respectively. Hence, a party to an agreement usually contemplates, although in most cases merely in an unsophisticated way, that
"the law" will shield him from a possible mistake, fraud, duress, or any
other instance of gross unfairness. Incidentally, upon such a view of the
psychological background of consensual interrelationships, the whole conception of a basic "rule of validation" so vigorously espoused by Ehrenzweig" as a first and foremost choice-of-law principle assumes a somewhat different dimension. This "basic rule" is a plausible formulation of a
legitimate public interest, i.e., to promote the security of transnational
transactions by according them, wherever reasonably possible, validity
and effect. On the other hand, such a validation principle cannot always,
and under any condition, be said to reflect accurately a generic state of
mind of contracting parties as a group to engage in binding transactions
only.
The psychological environment of a general legal perception ordinarily
surrounding consensual engagements has led many conflicts writers to
designate the parties' "expectations" or "intentions" as a paramount
choice-of-law criterion in the sphere of commercial transactions. Thus,
for instance, the "subjectivist" school of the "proper law of the contract"
doctrine in English conflicts law adheres to a "party autonomy" concept
and vests the parties with a substantial power to choose (or to "intend")
the governing law, whether by express stipulation or otherwise.' In the
absence of an explicit choice, judges are encouraged to "infer" or "presume" the intention of the parties with the aid of such intellectual tools
as common sense, presumptions, and fictions. In fact, in a mass of cases
where any express, or otherwise ascertainable, choice of law by the parties
is lacking, they probably never considered the matter at all and hence
could not possibly have formed any common intention with regard to
it. In such instances, by purporting to give effect to a nonexistent "implied" intent, judges are really using a cover-up gimmick designed to
disguise their attempt to reach results deemed desirable on grounds not
frankly articulated. There is ample support for the view that by overtly
striving to uphold parties' "inferred" intentions or "presumed" expectations, judges have in reality only sought to rationalize their own choiceof-law preferences.'
Any conception of parties' intents vis-i-vis applicable legal rules
must start from the premise that participants in consensual transactions
normally have in mind some specific prescription or system of law which
41 See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 9.
42

See A. DCEY & J. MoRRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 691-712 (8th ed. 1967). The "autonomy of
the parties" principle is currently endorsed by many conflicts systems including France, Switzerland,
and Germany. See Kegel, supra note 18, at 190 n.12.
4 See Harper, supra note 7, at 1164; James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflict
of Laws Contracts, 36 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 34, 35 (1959).
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is to be resorted to in case of future differences of opinion. In other
words, given the general atmosphere of law within which consensual
involvements are usually framed, what is left for judicial ascertainment
is the rather subsidiary question of identifying the particular jurisdiction
whose law the parties intended to govern the transaction. To be sure,
where the controlling document contains an express choice-of-law stipulation-a practice which is currently tolerated, indeed encouraged, in
many conflicts systems-such an hypothesis may appear to be wellfounded. Nonetheless, in the great bulk of instances where no partysponsored choice of law is discernible, its inner logic can rather easily be
challenged. On the basis of common sense and practical experience, it
seems far more plausible to assume that, though generally perceptive to
the legal setting of the interaction, ordinary participants usually do not
form any definite intention as to which specific law would apply in the
event of a prospective controversy. This is particularly true insofar as
routine arrangements and every-day participants are concerned. Big
enterprises conducting transnational operations can be expected to act
with more sophistication and precision. But then the legal instruments
drawn by such parties are apt in the first place not to be silent on the
choice-of-law question. It may further be suggested that even the active
participation of professional legal experts in the shaping of a transaction
does not necessarily guarantee any crystallization of common expectations as to the applicable law. The absence of an explicit choice-of-law
stipulation in a legal instrument drafted by lawyers and pertaining to
a transnational transaction may mean one of at least four things: (1) that
counsel on both sides just happened to overlook the matter; (2) that no
unanimity of opinion was reached on this score; (3) that it was frankly
resolved to leave the issue open for a future third-party adjudication,
should there be one; or (4) that one or both counsel consciously refrained, for one reason or another, from bringing the matter to the
negotiations table.
Torts. Once we shift from the sphere of consensual transactions to the
tort area, the profound overstatement of the "protection of parties' expectations" desideratum becomes much more evident. Viewed realistically,
many traditional torts-whether liability is conditioned on some wrongful intent, is fault-grounded, or is strict or absolute-do not ordinarily
admit of reasoning in terms of subjective expectations as to the applicable
legal standards. An excited groom who drives his car at excessive speed
in order not to be late to his wedding and thereby causes a traffic accident, a middle aged executive who finds the feminine charms of his young
secretary irresistible and proceeds to sexually assault her, and an overzealous magazine editor who gives vent to a flood of infamous utterances
thereby defaming a political rival-these and the like do not ordinarily
have any clear-cut, prior expectations regarding applicable legal standards. It is true, of course, that "a person has a legitimate interest to
know whether conduct upon which he is to embark is apt to expose him
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to damage claims."" But how many ordinary tortfeasors are disposed
consciously to consider, let alone laboriously to investigate, the matter?
Also, in tort instances, as contrasted with many consensual engagements, one is likely to encounter litigants who were not direct participants
in the tortious occurrence which gave rise to the controversy. Litigants
may include insurers, employers, parents, spouses, administrators and
other representatives of an estate, co-enterprisers, receivers, guardians,
custodians, survivors, dependents, and others. Such litigants could not
possibly foresee any applicable law at the time of the occurrence, since
they simply did not take any part in it.
It is therefore submitted that the concept of "reasonable and fair
expectations of the parties" in the tort choice-of-law process often lacks
empirical foundation. Hence, in the tort sphere, the validity of Ehrenzweig's endeavor to formulate "true" choice-of-law rules principally in
terms of the parties' foreseeability as to that law which will have a probable impact on the occurrence' is questionable.
However, in one currently expanding problem-area within the tort
sphere, that is, the law of enterprise accidents, the factors of reasonable
predictability and calculability do play a significant role. The ability of
large-scale enterprises to rely on reasonable expectations as to the juridical implications of a planned and insurable activity is universally
recognized as a meritorious goal.' Though an instance of, e.g., damage
resulting from a defective food product is accidental by its nature, the
commercial engagement in food processing is a planned activity. This
activity can be fashioned upon an informed evaluation of pertinent legal
standards. Transnational transporters, insurers, manufacturers, bankers,
suppliers, distributors, and the like are normally capable of foreseeing
contingencies of involvement with foreign legal institutions and prescriptions. Hence, they can take them into account when deciding on a
particular course of action, like determining prices and acquiring adequate
insurance coverage. Therefore, it would not ordinarily be unfair, e.g.,
for a jurisdiction adhering to a strict liability rule to apply its own law
in a case involving a local resident injured by a defective product of a
foreign manufacturer regularly marketing its products there. This will
be so even if the latter's home state subscribes to the traditional fault
criterion of liability. The plainly-foreseeable added financial burden is
nothing but a supplementary cost of doing business in that jurisdiction
which can be taken into account by the enterprise." The manufacturer
can protect itself with appropriate insurance.
Even conceding that "foreseeability" is relevant in the field of enterprise accidents, the forum ought not to speculate about the subjective,
actually-held expectations of the implicated enterprise regarding the ap"Rheinstein, supra note 20, at 659.
"See,
e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 9, at 555.
"See Katzenbach, supra note 26, at 1122 n.123.
47
See Note, Products Liability and the Choice of Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1452, 1462 (1965).
See generally Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": II, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960).
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plicable law. It should rather turn to objective criteria relating to whether
the enterprise could reasonably have foreseen an involvement with, e.g.,
the stricter standards of conduct or compensation prescribed by the
foreign jurisdiction in question. Naturally, the larger the enterprise's
volume of business and the more sophisticated its operations, the more
likely the forum would be to find objective foreseeability.
For the rest of the traditional tort field, outside the area of enterpriseaccident law, I would propose the abandonment of the whole lot of
abstract juridical speculations as to the "inferred," "presumed," or "assumed" expectations of the parties. The conception and terminology of
individual expectations are essentially inapt in this context of social interaction. Instead of shedding light, they tend to obscure the real issues. In
lieu of a futile endeavor to reason in terms of vindication of subjective
expectations, one should invoke an objective and functional test of rational connection as a fair criterion of justice to private interests."'
C. The "Equitable Responsibility To Ascertain Foreign

Law" Consideration
In certain instances, the rational connection idea can be formulated in
terms of an equitable responsibility, imposed on a party to a legal involvement, to acquire prior knowledge of a relevant legal standard and comply
with its requirements. In such cases, one assumes that that party knew
the substance of the relevant law or, more accurately, one charges him
with a duty to become familiar with it and abide by its directives. Actual
knowledge of the content of the relevant standard is not a prerequisite
to the existence of a rational connection linking it with the party so
charged. The criterion is again an objective one-the reasonableness of
an imposed burden of ascertainment and compliance. A party who fails
to discharge such equitable responsibility assigned to him cannot complain at the later stage of litigation that the assessment of his conduct
according to that particular standard unduly interferes with the prin-

ciple of rational connection.

Which participants in legal involvements may properly be charged
with such responsibility? Generally speaking, it is the more resourceful,
experienced, enlightened, and sophisticated party on whom the obligation
of familiarity may fairly be imposed. The stronger parties to "adhesion,"
"standard form," or "ticket" contracts; governmental agencies; public
institutions; big private corporations and other enterprises like public
carriers, products manufacturers, banks, and insurance companies; businesses with a large volume of international operations; promoters and
initiators; and otherwise the soliciting or more organized and active
partners to transactions can usually be regarded as being far more knowledgeable, experienced, and legally sophisticated than the individual parties
with whom they engage in various transactions." Therefore, it would be
48Cf. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215,
241

(1963).
"' See section III infra.
SeSee Katzenbach, supra note 26, at 1127.
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more fair to hold the former to a duty of ascertaining in advance and
adhering to whatever regulatory prescriptions may be relevant in the
circumstances.
A secondary guide to the identification of the party equitably chargeable with such responsibility lies in the reasonable foreseeability of forthcoming litigation by one or the other party at some pertinent point in
time. Thus, if party A could contemplate a prospective lawsuit as likely
to emanate from a given occurrence well before party B, the former may
occasionally be burdened with the duty to ascertain and fulfill relevant
legal requirements.
D. The "Reasonable Reliance" Criterion
Situations may arise where a litigant can advance a sensible argument
to the effect that he has acted in a certain socio-legal atmosphere and in
reliance on its specific notions and institutions. Hence, it would be unfair
to measure his conduct by the differing conceptions of an alien environment.
Perhaps the clearest instance of a "reliance" case is when a person is
affirmatively required by a law in effect at the place of his presence to
act in a specified way. For a foreign forum to hold him liable for the
effects of such legally compelled action, or to order the execution of a
pattern of conduct in a place where it is suppressed, would ordinarily
be grossly unfair. 1 But even short of a clear-cut mandatory obligation,
an actor's assertion that he was stimulated, authorized, or privileged to
model his involvements on the legal schemas in force at the place of
conduct ought not to be lightly brushed aside. People are initially entitled to carry out their affairs with a view to the normative order prevailing at the place of behavior, even though these same affairs may prove
to have repercussions of some sort in other jurisdictions."
However, such a concession in favor of the validity of an argument
whereby a litigant seeks to demonstrate that he truly acted in reliance
on the law of the place of conduct must not be overstated. It may easily
mislead the unwary into making unwarranted generalizations, such as:
"where the tort is based on fault, the law of the place of that act has
some claim to controlling the penalty. For it seems unfair to punish the
defendant for an act that was not a tort or wrong under the law under
which he acted."" Equally dubious as a general truth is the somewhat
obscure "reliance" assertion made, e.g., by a pedestrian-resident of state
X injured there by a driver-resident of state Y to the effect that the more
liberal compensation standard of X should invariably control because he,
"tSee Kegel, supra note 18, at 252; Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems, 21
U. PITT. L. REV. 573, 582 (1960).
" One example of such an affair is a person inflicting an injury on an alien coming from a

jurisdiction with a more stringent standard of liability: "By entering the . . . nation, the [injured]
visitor has exposed himself to the risks of the territory and should not expect to subject persons
living there to a financial hazard that their law had not created." D. CAVERS, supra note 12, at
147.
'3 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 9, at 569.
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the injured plaintiff, "relied" on it. His rights, so runs the argument,
ought not to depend on the fact that the defendant happens to come
from a foreign jurisdiction subscribing to a less exacting compensatory
policy on which the former never "relied." The tenability of any reliance
contention is first dependent on a showing that the party concerned actually, reasonably, and in good faith acted in pursuit of some particular
legal provision. Only when conduct was shaped in specific reliance on
some legal prescription may its subsequent appraisal according to a
different index result in unjustified hardship to the actor.' One can
hardly imagine any convincing "reliance" allegation in regard to, e.g.,
a rule of interspousal immunity or abatement of civil injury actions.
The legitimacy of a "reasonable reliance" argument in the choice-oflaw process is grounded in two related considerations: the value of legal
guidance and the reluctance to allow unfair surprise. Many rules of law
may fairly be said to serve the useful purpose of providing guidance to
parties in ordering their affairs. This is particularly evident in the area
of planned activities, like commercial transactions. If such a value of
guidance is to be fostered, people ought to be encouraged to seek informed familiarity with legal provisions bearing on their prospective
engagements in those spheres of human endeavor where legal planning
plays a conduct-affecting role. By the same token, a judicial tribunal
should normally be loath to invoke a legal prescription where its application would in fact unreasonably surprise or unfairly prejudice a party.
III. A

PROPOSED INCLUSIVE "FAIR NOTICE" RATIONALE

The foregoing analysis of the notions of "submission," "expectations,"
"responsibility," and "reliance" demonstrates that they can, at best,
offer but a partial rationalization for the principle of rational connection.
It is therefore proposed to rest this principle on an inclusive and objective
concept of fair notice as to the potential foreign law connotations of a
given occurrence. In other words, the test for the assessment of private
interests in choice-of-law litigation should be the following: can one
justly charge a party with a timely prior notice regarding the potential
transnationalramifications of the relationship at bar?
Objective Fair Notice. It is emphatically pointed out that the suggested
criterion is an objective one and grounded in the familiar legal precept
of reasonableness under all pertinent circumstances. Hence, actual knowledge of the specific tenor of the ultimately controlling rule, whether
domestic or foreign, is not a necessary component of fair notice. Moreover, since in many instances people do not pattern their involvements
with any particular standard of law in mind, it would not make much
sense generally to equate fair notice with reasonable contemplation as
to the applicability of a concrete legal standard. Rather, the decisive
consideration should be whether a party could have perceived at the
"4 See B.

CURRIE,

FuR OTTO RIESE

supra note 21, at 47; Drion, The Lex Loci Delicti in Retreat, in FESTSCHRIFr

236 (1964).
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proper time a potential contact with persons, property, relationships,
institutions, or occurrences in which a given jurisdiction may claim a
legitimate interest. Within a purely domestic arena of interactions, one
usually charges the participants with fair knowledge of the legal standards
at stake. This commonly accepted premise, on which the very administrability of the legal order is dependent, loses its routine quality once
foreign parties or occurrences enter the picture. In such instances, a
complex question may arise as to whether a particular litigant could
reasonably have contemplated an involvement with matters falling under
the legal management of a foreign jurisdiction. Thus, an issue may evolve
as to whether a merchant from state X doing business with a woman
resident of state Y could be charged with fair notice respecting the incapacity-of-married-women rule in force in Y;5 or whether a bartender
selling liquor in state X to a car driver en route to immediately neighboring state Y should reasonably have anticipated a possible involvement with Y's dram shop act; 56 or whether an automobile renting agency
can fairly be held vicariously liable for its patrons' operations in foreign
jurisdictions.
If the forum is satisfied that fair notice thus defined does in fact
exist, an allegation of undue violation of private interests must usually
fail. This is true irrespective of the subjective contemplations the party
in question has formed. But even a convincing showing of a lack of fair
notice, i.e., rational connection, of itself and without more does not
automatically warrant a finding of unjustified interference with private
interests. The party concerned must prove in addition that the absence
of such fair notice really operates to his detriment and unjustly encroaches
upon his rights." Thus, in various instances of planned activity, where
there is specific reliance on particular regulatory schemes, it will probably be easy to show that lack of fair notice did result in actual harm to
justifiably-held interests. By contrast, in a host of situations where people normally act without any perception of concrete legal standards, it
may well prove to be difficult to make up a successful interference-withprivate-interests argument. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical case: A, an automobile-renting enterprise doing business in country X, rents a car to B, an X resident, for use in X during a specified
period of time. B, without permission, takes the car to a neighboring
country, Y, where he negligently harms C, a resident of Y. Under Y's
law, automobile-renting enterprises are absolutely liable for injuries occasioned by their patrons, whereas X does not impose any such specific
liability on the car-renting industry. C institutes action for damages
against A in a Y court. Suppose that the forum wishes to apply its strict
"See Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. R. 241 (1878).
5Cf. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
"TSee RES-rATMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 174 (Prop. Off. Draft, pt. II, 1968).
s Thus, in a rather paradoxical manner, we might find ourselves drawing upon the familiar,
and now quite discredited, idea of "vested rights" in the sense of "protecting reasonable expectations from attrition . . . [and] stabilizing private relations .
Katzenbach, supra note 26, at
1107.
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liability rule. A may object on the ground that at the relevant time, i.e.,
the renting of the car, it did not and could not reasonably have had fair
notice to the effect that B would venture an unauthorized trip to Y. As
proof of this it might show that special procedures, always followed in the
renting of cars for out-of-state usage, were not followed in this case.
At first blush it may seem that A has convincingly established a lack of
rational connection. Assume, however, that the rental charged and insurance coverage acquired by A is uniform, irrespective of the intended
local or foreign usage of the rented vehicle, and that the differences between
the two kinds of operations actually represent inconsequential administrative routine. Under such an assumption, the court may plausibly conclude that the absence of fair notice, in the circumstances, does not frustrate any substantial interest of A, because had it had fair notice it would
not have acted any differently. Contrariwise, A may come forward with
evidence to the effect that its renting of a car for driving in any country
other than X involves a varying scale of rental charges, calculated on the
basis of the particular liability standards prevalent in each such country
and the specific insurance coverages taken out accordingly. In that case,
one may decide that the defendant has successfully pointed to a sufficiently significant disruption of justified interests.
For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the proposed notion of
objective fair notice as the underlying rationale of the rational connection
principle does not exclude the possibility of an occasional resort to the concepts of "submission," "foreseeability," "responsibility," and "reliance."
Any of these concepts may indeed be invoked in order to illustrate more
concretely relevant private interests in particular circumstances. In fact,
they actually constitute integral components of the more comprehensive
notion of objective fair notice.
Identification of Relevant Time. The identification of the proper point
in time when a rational connection should exist is naturally a crucial step
in the process of private interests analysis. Again, the only seemingly feasible criterion for the determination of the decisive temporal phase is of
the familiar, objective type: reasonableness in the light of all pertinent
circumstances. Fair notice, in order to be meaningful, must be ascertainable at a stage when it could presumably affect the course of conduct
undertaken by a party. Thus, the time of entering into a contract, of
establishing a marital relationship, of purchasing property, of making
a will, of renting a car, of selling liquor to an intoxicated driver, of deciding on the pricing of marketed products and services, and of determining whether, when, where, or how to litigate a dispute would ordinarily
be regarded as pertinent to the rational connection issue. It is perhaps
tempting for the sake of simplicity to summarize the temporal factor by
an exclusive designation of the "time of conduct" as invariably material.
But if the implied reference is only to the operative facts constituting
the original cause of action, it may on occasion prove to be unacceptable.
Acts or decisions pertinent to fair notice considerations may well take
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place at an earlier or later time. For instance, the financial calculations
undertaken by an industrial enterprise when deciding on its pricing policy,
long before the concrete harmful impact in question has occurred, may
be deemed eminently relevant to the question of rational connection.
Likewise, the reasonableness of parties' actions after injury has been sustained, in a sophisticated atmosphere of anticipated litigation in a particular forum, can play a dominant role in the resolution of certain issues. Thus, the issue of compliance with formal requirements relating, e.g.,
to a modification of a contractual stipulation or a waiver of an agreed
immunity may be evaluated in view of the understanding attributable
to parties already benefiting from legal advice and seriously contemplating
adjudication of their differences.5 In sum, the question of the relevant
time must be determined with an eye to the particular issue under all the
relevant circumstances.
Territoriality. At this point it would be useful to comment briefly on
the significance of territoriality to the idea of fair notice. One can readily
detect in contemporary American conflicts thinking, most notably in
Currie's writings," an understandable reaction against anything reminiscent of the now-discredited concept of territorialism. Governmental
interests, in this view, are "neutral" or "functional," rather than "territorial" or "personal" in essence. Though by no means denying the plausibility of this modern approach, it is nonetheless submitted that the concept of territoriality may still have some practical relevance as a helpful
tool in the resolution of the fair notice issue in particular cases. Categorical
statements to the effect that "in this territorially divided world . . .we
have come to accept as fair the application of territorial law except in some
unusual situation . . . ,"' or that "the significance of territoriality is
present to the minds of most people ' do indeed seem far too sweeping in
their terms. It is nevertheless true that, at times, residents of a country X
travelling in or acting in or otherwise associated with affairs in country Y
actually are or should reasonably be mindful of potential involvements
with Y's legal order." It follows that the very extraterritorial nature of
an occurrence may often have a significant bearing on the issue of fair
notice, at least on the international, in contradistinction to the interstate,
scene.
Application of the Rational Connection Principle to Different Prescriptions. Finally, a rather complex problem may evolve as to whether the
rational connection principle applies with equal force, or indeed at all, to
different kinds of legal prescriptions. For instance, it is commonly asserted that as to matters of judicial procedure, the parties' contemplaSCf. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
" See generally B. CURRIE, supra note 21.
61 D.

CAVERS, supra note 12, at 303.

" G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (6th ed. 1961).
" Cf. Katzenbach, supra note 26, at 1145. But cf., with regard to American interstate engagements, Baxter, supra note 22, at 1: "[M]embers of our society, in both their personal and
business activities, increasingly disregard the existence of state boundaries."
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tions are, at best, a negligible concern. " This is again an oversimplified
proposition. Suppose a case implicating A, a resident of state X, and B, a
manufacturer based in state Y but doing business through an agency in X.
A purchases in X one of B's products and subsequently suffers an injury
resulting from a latent defect in the product. A considers commencing a
suit for damages in an X court but as a preliminary step engages, through
counsel, in negotiations with B's representatives in an attempt to reach
an amicable settlement. Both X and Y subscribe to rather short limitations

periods of only six months during which a lawsuit may be brought in such
instances. However, under X's law this limitations provision may be
stipulated away by the parties' filing with the court a duly executed
waiver to that effect. Y's corresponding rule is mandatory and inescapable by any device whatever. A's counsel, anticipating a lengthy process
of negotiations and reasonably contemplating the invocation by an X
forum of its own limitations law, procures from B's representatives an
appropriate waiver and files it with the competent court in X. Settlement
not having been reached within six months, A proceeds to trial. The X
forum rather unexpectedly considers applying Y's compulsory limitations rule in deference to the supposedly more pressing interests of B's
home-base and center of activity. In such an eventuality, A's assumed
lack of fair notice, albeit concerning an arguably procedural prescription,
should be weighed as a material, perhaps overriding, counter-consideration
against resort to Y's law. In sum, the relevance of private interests must
not be automatically dismissed as a result of applying generalized labels like
"procedure." Rather, it ought to be empirically and fairly analyzed in
the light of the specific features of each particular case.
IV. THE ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A COHERENT PART
OF THE PROCESS OF INTEREST ANALYSIS

Any one adhering to a pervasive "policy"-"justice" dichotomy in the
choice-of-law process must sooner or later confront a difficult dilemma.
Is rational connection a mere precondition to the invocation of a law otherwise determined relevant, or is it in itself capable of constituting an independent ground for the appropriate application of a legal rule? The
whole dilemma is apt to become trivial once one realizes that no such
jurisprudential dichotomy between public and private interests does in
fact exist. As already pointed out, the insistence on fair notice is as much
a "public" concern to a given jurisdiction as, e.g., the promotion of traffic safety on its highways or the securing of the integrity of its workmen's compensation system. However, it is simply convenient to designate certain interests as "private" since they are ordinarily expressed in
terms of specific, immediate concerns of the individual litigants as such,
rather than in terms of broad societal goals. Also, the private parties to
a controversy can be expected to be more responsive to such questions as
individual expectations and reliances than to general political or social
" This attitude explains the non-applicability to procedural matters of the presumption against
retroactive application of legislative measures.
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concerns. This, in turn, may affect one's thinking about the proper allocation of interest-ascertainment responsibility between the adversaries
and the judge. Nonetheless, the terminological expedient of "private
interests" ought not to obscure the basic fact that individuals have also
a personal, "private" if you will, stake in the general socio-economic
policies and principles of justice espoused by the community at large."
To put it differently, "justice in the particular case" emerges as a
unique problem in the choice-of-law process only if that process fails
to account for the fundamental coincidence of public and private interests. Under the systematics of the traditional approach to choice of
law, there is, of course, no room for a coherent analysis of community
interests. But even the current proponents of a functional methodology of
the Currie-type constantly run into difficulties in the area of "fairness to
the parties," due to their narrow conception of interests which encompasses only, or mainly, socio-economic policies. It is therefore suggested
that "policy" and "justice" considerations ought not to be pitted one
against the other in a way requiring a threshold allocation of priority
between them. Rather, all public and private interests implicated in a
given conflicts situation should be considered together as a coherent body
of concerns pertinent to the choice-of-law process. Thus, when determining the proper reach to be accorded a legal standard in a conflicts
instance, the forum would at once consider its general underlying purpose and the particular private interests at stake. That is, the factor of
fair notice as to individuals' potential involvement with the institutional
domain of a given jurisdiction must always form an integral part of
interest analysis in conflicts instances. In this manner, a forum will never
reach a conclusion as to a rule's appropriate scope of coverage in a conflicts situation before first accounting for the rational connection between
the rule and the potentially affected party. "Impact" and "fairness" or
"public" and "private" considerations alike, in no doctrinally preconceived order of preference, are always relevant criteria in the choice-oflaw process."
It goes without saying that the relative significance to be ascribed to
particular public or private interests varies immensely from case to case
according to the specific circumstances. The factors relevant to such a

delicate weight determination include the nature of the occurrence, the
identity of the parties, and the essence of the implicated legal norms.
It is undoubtedly true that "the extent to which a given law furthers
the purposes of the public as a whole as distinguished from the purposes

of individuals under particular conditions ranges over a spectrum.""
Consequently, with regard to laws "which have little concern to the
public except as the public is composed of individuals . . . ,"8 e.g., rules
'5 "Just as the state is made up of and exists for individuals and groups, the individual finds
fulfillment and completion as a member of organized society." A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN,
THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 237 (1965).
s Cf. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 845, 872 (1961).
" D. CAVERS, supra note 12, at 102.
6s Id.
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concerning form of wills, a greater significance may frequently be attached to private interests. Conversely, in such areas as taxation and
antitrust, public interests will often assume a dominant role. Also, in
instances where it proves virtually impossible to determine whether one
or the other public interest outweighs its rival, a decision in terms of
private interests may become apt. Consider, e.g., the following hypothetical: A traffic accident occurs in state X as a result of which A, a
resident of X, is injured, and the tortfeasor B, a resident of Y, is killed.
X law provides for survivorship of civil injury claims whereas Y is still
committed to the old common-law rule of abatement."' A brings suit
against B's estate in a Y court. Suppose that Y's abatement rule embodies
a concern for the integrity of its residents' estates to the benefit of local
dependents, whereas X's survivorship prescription expresses a concern for
the welfare of its injured residents. Under such a supposition, the case
presents a genuine conflict of public interests. The Y forum may plausibly
resolve the conflict in favor of applying X survivorship law, on the
ground that at the time of accident a rational connection existed between
that law and both parties. The plaintiff was engaged in, e.g., a legal crossing of a road intersection in his home country, and the tortfeasor driving
a car in a foreign jurisdiction cannot claim a lack of fair notice as to
potential involvement with matters in which the latter may have an
interest. By contrast, there existed at the relevant time no possible rational
connection between the plaintiff and the legal system of Y. Hence, it
would be unfair to deprive him of his right to compensation safeguarded
by his own home country.
In a host of conflicts instances one can reasonably anticipate relevant
public and private concerns pushing in opposite directions." Moreover,
in one and the same case the respective fair expectations or reasonable
reliances of the individual adversaries may well militate in favor of differing solutions. All these and like clashes are apt to pose hard choices to a
tribunal engaging in interest analysis.1

"Cf. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
"oSuch a potential area of conflict between public and private interests is that of "party autonomy," i.e., explicit choices of law effected by the parties themselves, in the sphere of commercial
transactions. See A. VoN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 65, at 285.
"1One might, perhaps, wish to consider the feasibility of formulating some generalized indices
of rational connection as useful guidelines to judicial analysis. The prospects of such standardization
being successful are indeed dim, since the very essence of fair notice would ordinarily call for
concrete assessment of all the pertinent circumstances of each individual case.

